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This Article explores how the use of predictive surveillance to
prevent terrorist and criminal activity may shape Fourth Amendment
law. Predictive surveillance refers to a potential model of surveillance
in which government collects data in bulk and then uses predictive
analytics to detect patterns indicating terrorist or criminal activity. The
existing model of surveillance regulation presumes that the
government's first step is to target a specific person. Therefore, the first
analytical step in evaluating the constitutionality of a given surveillance
practice is to determine whether the government had sufficient
particularized suspicion about the target. Predictive surveillance,
however, confounds the existing model because it requires collection of
massive amounts of data with no particularized suspicion. Despite that
disconnect, judges will face great pressure to twist existing doctrine
rather than ban the data collection that the government claims is
necessary to fight terrorism or crime. Assuming that courts will be
predisposed to find predictive surveillance constitutional, this Article
explores the various doctrinal approaches that courts could take to
approve predictive surveillance and assesses the risk that each
approach poses to Fourth Amendment doctrine.,
Part I introduces the concept of predictive analytics and describes
predictive surveillance as a potential application of predictive analytics.
Part II first identifies the technical and political challenges that the
government will face if it tries to implement predictive surveillance and
then discusses the reasons to believe that researchers and political
actors will overcome these challenges. Part III describes why predictive
surveillance threatens Fourth Amendment doctrine itself and offers a
cautionary tale of how courts evaluating a prior mass surveillance
program twisted the statutory language to authorize the program. Part
IV discusses the different ways that courts could apply the Fourth
Amendment's third-party and public-exposure doctrines to predictive
surveillance and then assesses how each approach could affect the
development of those doctrines. Finally, Part V discusses the different
I This Article focuses on the constitutionality of the data collection necessary to conduct
predictive surveillance. This Article does not address the constitutionality of using
predictive analytics on data that the government already possesses or that third parties
have sold to the government or shared with the government voluntarily.
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ways that courts could apply the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standard to predictive surveillance and assesses how each approach
could affect the reasonableness standard.
I. WHAT IS PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE?
Predictive surveillance is one potential application of predictive
analytics, a branch of data science that predicts future behavior based
on the patterns found in past behavior.2 Predictive analytics applies
statistical and computational tools to often massive volumes of data to
find and act upon patterns in the data. One common approach to
predictive analytics involves "training" a predictive algorithm on a
subset of data about which you know the outcome, testing the algorithm
on a different subset of that data, and finally applying the algorithm in.
real time to emerging data to help predict future outcomes. 3
Public and private entities alike are using predictive analytics.
Employers analyze employee data to predict which employees are likely
to leave and decide how to retain employees at risk of departure.4
Merchants use predictive analytics to identify customers likely to switch
to competing products or services.5 Manufacturers use real-time data
from "smart" devices to predict when machines will fail.6 Doctors use
patient data to build algorithms to predict which intensive care unit
patients will develop sepsis.7 Government agencies use predictive
2 ERIC SIEGEL, PREDIcTIvE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE,
OR DIE 11, 80 (2013).
3 vIJAY Koru & BALA DESHPANDE, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS AND DATA MINING: CONCEPTS &
PRACTICE WITH RAPIDMINER 17-19, 27-28 (2015).
4 John Boudreau, Predict What Employees Will Do Without Freaking Them Out, HARv.
Bus. REv. (Sept. 5, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/o9/predict-what-employees-will-do-
without-freaking-them-out [https://perma.cc/69TH-SU7G].
5 Analyzing Customer Churn by Using Azure Machine Learning, MICROSOFT AZURE (Dec.
13, 2016), https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/machine-learning/machine-learning-
azure-ml-customer-churn-scenario [https://perma.cc/68R5-CLM3].
6 Jacob LaRiviere et al., Where Predictive Analytics Is Having the Biggest Impact, HARV.
Bus. REv. (May 25, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/o5/where-predictive-analytics-is-having-
the-biggest-impact [https://perma.cc/38GV-UYGA].
7 Thomas Desautels et al., Prediction of Sepsis in the Intensive Care Unit with Minimal
Electronic Health Record Data: A Machine Learning Approach, JMIR MED. INFORM.
(Sept. 30, 2016),
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analytics to identify fraud in tax returns and government contracts.8
Predictive analytics is already in widespread private and public sector
use, and its footprint is growing.9
Predictive surveillance refers to the potential use of predictive
analytics to predict terrorist or criminal activity.1o As with any use of
predictive analytics, predictive surveillance requires massive data
collection in order to build and test predictive models and then apply
those models in real time.
Predictive surveillance differs from traditional surveillance because
traditional surveillance begins with a targeting decision. Under the
traditional surveillance model, the government first decides to target
someone based on some degree of particularized suspicion.,' Under
predictive surveillance, however, the government would not begin with
any degree of individualized suspicion about a surveillance target. In
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5o6568o/?report=printable
[https://perma.cc/YCN6-ZSDU].
8 SIEGEL, supra note 2, at tbl.5; Government: Our Work, ELDER RESEARCH, INC.,
http://datamininglab.com/solutions/industries/government [https://perma.cc/LA3C-
4FB2].
9 See, e.g., Louis Columbus, 89% ofB2B Marketers Have Predictive Analytics On Their
Roadmaps For 2016, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2016/ol/24/89-of-b2b-marketers-have-
predictive-analytics-on-their-roadmaps-for-2016/#52efdcbf1822
[https://perma.cc/ML7Z-CM8L] (reporting survey findings that 49 percent of business to
business marketers already use predictive analytics, and 40 percent plan to start using it
within six months); LaRiviere et al., supra note 6 (discussing impact of predictive analytics
for predicting consumer demand, optimizing consumer pricing, and predicting supply
chain maintenance needs).
1o Shaun B. Spencer, When Targeting Becomes Secondary: A Framework for Regulating
Predictive Surveillance in Anti-Terror Investigations, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 493, 495-96
(2015).
1 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a)-(b) (2012) (criminal investigators relying on the Wiretap
Act must demonstrate to a court that there is probable cause to believe that the
interception will reveal evidence of a felony listed in Section 2516); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)
(2012) (under the Stored Communications Act, the government may compel an internet
service provider to produce subscriber information by showing "reasonable grounds to
believe" that the records are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation);
50 U.S.C. § 18o4(a)(3)(A) (2012) (foreign intelligence investigators seeking to intercept
electronic communications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act must show
probable cause to believe that the surveillance target is "a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power"); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (criminal investigators
installing a GPS device to track a suspect's car must first obtain a warrant based on
probable cause to believe that the tracking will reveal evidence of a crime).
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fact, the government would have no target in mind at all. Instead, the
government would begin by collecting and analyzing all available data
to find patterns that correlate with past terrorist or criminal activity.
Then the government would use predictive algorithms to identify
similar patterns in emerging data and, based on those patterns, use
traditional targeted surveillance to investigate the suspects.1 2
The constitutionality of predictive surveillance is a moot point
unless the government actually attempts to implement it. The next Part,
therefore, discusses the extent to which predictive surveillance is
technically and politically possible.
II. THE TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF PREDICTIVE
SURVEILLANCE
If predictive surveillance never becomes technically or politically
viable, then courts will not have to confront the constitutional issues
discussed below. This Part first discusses the technical challenges to
predictive surveillance and the reasons to believe that researchers will
overcome those challenges. This Part next discusses the historical
public opposition to pervasive surveillance technologies and the
reasons to believe that the government will nevertheless implement
predictive surveillance if it becomes technically viable.
A. The Potential ofPredictive Surveillance as a Counter-Terrorism
and Law Enforcement Tool
Predicting terrorist activity is an especially challenging application
of predictive analytics for several reasons. First, terrorist activity has a
very low "base rate" because it occurs quite rarely.13 Some experts have
argued that terrorist attacks and plots are so rare that they will not
generate a unique signature that can be heard above the noise of all
n Spencer, supra note 10, at 504.
13 Neil D. Shortland, "On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Dog": The Online Risk
Assessment of Violent Extremists, in COMBATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM & RADICALIZATION
IN THE DIGITAL ERA 352 (Majeed Khader et al. eds., 2016) ("COMBATING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM"); Jenna McLaughlin, The White House Asked Social Media Companies to
Look for Terrorists. Here's Why They'd #Fail, THE INTERCEPT, (Jan. 20, 2016),
https://theintercept.com/2016/ol/2/the-white-house-asked-social-media-companies-to-
look-for-terrorists-heres-why-theyd-fail/ [https://perma.cc/76Z8-RPPB].
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online activity.14 Second, given the vast amount of internet activity,
using predictive analytics may produce many "false positives."15
Predictive surveillance is vulnerable to false positives because it may be
difficult to discern patterns that distinguish terrorism-related activity
from innocent Internet activity. 16 Too many false positives will yield far
too many suspects for law enforcement or counter-terrorism agents to
pursue.
However, there is reason to believe that researchers may overcome
these technical obstacles. First, with regard to low base rates, the
unfortunate reality is that terrorist plots and attacks are becoming more
common in the United States and across the globe. One source of data
collection on domestic terrorism is the Empirical Assessment of
Domestic Radicalization (EADR), a project of the National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. EADR
researchers built a dataset on individual radicalization in the United
States from 1948 to 2013.17 Their dataset includes several measures
showing domestic terrorist activity on the rise since 2000. One measure
tracks the numbers of individuals revealed to have been "radicalized."Bi
14 Jeff Jonas & Jim Harper, Effective Counterterrorism and the Limited Role ofPredictive
Data Mining, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS 584, 7-8 (Dec. 11, 20o6),
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa584.pdf [https://perma.cc/BLN5-
7UQ5]; McLaughlin, supra note 13; Bruce Schneier, Data Mining for Terrorists, SCHNEIER
ON SECURITY (Mar. 9, 2006),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/data-mining-for.html
[https://perma.cc/8QUD-MQPQ].
is Jonas & Harper, supra note 14, at 7-8; McLaughlin, supra note 13; Schneier, supra note
14.
16 Jonas & Harper, supra note 14, at 8; David Romyn & Mark Kebbell, Using the Internet to
Plan for Terrorist Attack, in COMBATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, supra note 13, at 100;
Shortland, supra note 13, at 352 (noting that extremists' online activities may be clear
indicators of intent in hindsight, but finding those indicators in real time may be
impossible because of how many other individuals demonstrate the same behavioral
indicators online but lack the intent or capacity to take violent action).
17 Empirical Assessment ofDomestic Radicalization (EADR), NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR
THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TOTERRORISM,
http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/empirical-assessment-domestic-
radicalization-eadr [https://perma.cc/QK9K-G93C].
18 Though the term "radicalized" may be susceptible of conflicting and controversial
interpretations, the EADR study defines it quite broadly. The EADR dataset includes
"individuals espousing Islamist, far right, far left, or single-issue ideologies who have
radicalized within the United States to the point of committing ideologically motivated
illegal violent or non-violent acts, joining a terrorist organization, or associating with an
extremist organization whose leader(s) has/have been indicted of an ideologically
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The EADR dataset shows that the number of individuals revealed as
radicalized stood at 193 in the 1970S, 242 in the 1980s, and 298 in the
1990s. In the 2ooos, however, that figure jumped to 451, and the figure
is on pace to exceed 400 this decade.19 Another EADR measure tracks
the number of terrorist plots in which those radicalized individuals
were involved, ranging from "nebulous" plots to executed attacks.
There were 117 plots discovered in the 1970s, 148 in the 198os, and 142
in the 1990s. In the 2000s, the total jumped to 209, and the figure is on
pace to exceed 200 again in the 2010S. 2 0
Second, with regard to a discernible terrorism "signature," terrorist
activity increasingly occurs online. The Internet has become an
important tool for violent extremist organizations.21 It plays a central
motivated violent offense." NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND
RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, PROFILES OF INDIVIDUAL RADICALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(PIRUS) CODEBOOK 3 (2016),
http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/research/PIRUSCodebook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9P6E-PSSF]. More specifically, the EADR treats the following as
"radicalized":
anyone arrested, indicted, and/or convicted of either engaging or planning to
engage in ideologically motivated unlawful behavior, or anyone who belonged to a
designated terrorist organization or a violent extremist group. For planned
violence, there must be a fairly direct connection between the individual and the
plot. Note: radicalization does not necessarily involve violence. An individual who
provides material support to an Islamist group because he/she identifies with the
group's goals but does not participate in any attacks, or someone who runs a
website for a violent extremist group, or is arrested for trespassing because they
were stalking an individual for ideological reasons (like animal rights activists
harassing employees of medical research labs) would count as radicalized. Note:
radicalization does not include non-ideological criminal acts or legal ideological
activities. For example, selling weapons to a group for material gains rather than
ideological affinity would not count as radicalized. And someone who openly
supports an extremist group that participates in politics (such as voting for a
Communist Party candidate for office) would also not be radicalized.
Id. at 4-5.
19 Empirical Assessment ofDomestic Radicalization (EADR), NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR
THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, http://www.start.umd.edu/data-
tools/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-pirus [https://perma.cc/3AU3-
LC5A].
20 Id.
2 Fredrik Johansson et al., Detecting Linguistic Markers of Violent Extremism in Online
Environments, in COMBATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, supra note 13, at 375; Jennifer Yang
Hui, Social Media Analytics for Intelligence and Countering Violent Extremism, in
COMBATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, supra note 13, at 328; Robyn Torok, Social Media and
the Use ofDiscursive Markers of Online Extremism & Recruitment, in COMBATING
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role in recruitment, planning, and operations by foreign insurgencies
on United States soil.22 Similarly, according to the United Kingdom's
domestic security agency, MI5, at least seven of the last ten attacks in
the United Kingdom since 2010 involved perpetrators who read
Al-Quaeda's online platform Inspire, which "significantly enhanced"
the capacity of four of those ten perpetrators. 2 3 Extremist organizations
use the Internet "to recruit, deliver threats, release instructional
materials to facilitate the actions of others, and plan and coordinate
violent extremist attacks."24 Data from the Empirical Assessment of
Domestic Radicalization25 confirms that terrorist recruitment and
planning in the United States increasingly involves the Internet. The
EADR dataset shows that, for the 250 radicalized individuals involved
in domestic terrorist plots revealed in the United States since 2005, the
Internet played a primary role in the radicalization of 30 (12%), and
played some role in the radicalization of an additional 92 (37%).26 Of
the 156 planned, failed, and successful domestic plots by those
radicalized individuals, the Internet was used for communications or
logistics in 68 of them (44%).27
Even lone wolf attackers have increasingly visible online profiles.
Many lone wolf attackers "are only loners in their offline life, but are
often very active in communicating their views and radical opinions in
vIOLENT EXTREMISM, supra note 13, at 39 ("Social media has now become the mainstream
recruitment platform for online radicals and extremists.").
22 Shortland, supra note 13, at 350.
23 Id.
24 Id. The Internet plays three main roles in radicalization: indoctrinating recruits into the
organization's belief system, distributing the organization's ideology, and socializing
recruits to provide them a sense of community. Erin Marie Saltman, Western Female
Migrands to ISIS: Propaganda, Radicalization, & Recruitment, in COMBATING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM, supra note 13, at 18o.
25 See, NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO
TERRORISM, supra note 18; see also, EADR, supra note 19.
26 Dataset available for download at: Profiles ofIndividual Radicalization in the United
States (PIRUS), NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO
TERRORISM, http://www.start.umd.edu/data-tools/profiles-individual-radicalization-
united-states-pirus [https://perma.cc/Y776-MZCD].
27 Id.
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various discussion groups or other kinds of social media."2 8 In fact,
"[a]lmost all lone wolf attacks in recent years have involved the use of
social media."29 A study of 98 lone-actor terrorist plots in EU countries
from 2000 to 2014 found that the perpetrators' social media use
increased steadily since 2004.30 One-third of those lone-actor terrorists
used the Internet for tactical research such as downloading manuals,
watching training videos, or basic reconnaissance.31
In addition to relying on the increased number and Internet
visibility of terrorist plots, researchers can maximize their chances of
detecting meaningful signals by training algorithms not on rare events
like successful attacks, but on more common events like radicalization
and nascent plots and on events involving networks that generate larger
signals. Even if researchers are unable to produce algorithms
identifying individuals with perfect accuracy, they may be able to flag a
manageable number of potential suspects for human analysts to
investigate further.32 Additionally, predictive surveillance could prove
successful in detecting activity with a higher base rate such as cyber-
attacks, money laundering, or fraud.
Researchers are beginning to tackle these technical problems. For
example, Johansson et al. developed a prototype for an online tool to
detect warning behaviors predicting online violent extremism.33 They
focused on three warning behaviors most likely to appear in social
28 Joel Brynielsson et al., Harvesting and analysis of weak signals for detecting lone wolf
terrorists, SECURITY INFORMATICS (2013), https://security-
informatics.springeropen.com/track/pdf/io.1186/219o-8532-2-11?site=security-
informatics.springeropen.com [https://perma.cc/3WQC-DJ3F].
29 Loo Seng Neo, An Internet-Mediated Pathway for Online Radicalisation: RECRO, in
COMBATING VIOLENT ExTREMISM 199; Shortland, supra note 13, at 197-225.
3o Clare Ellis et al., Lone-Actor Terrorism, ROYAL UNITED SERVS. INST. FOR DEF. & SEC.
STUDIES, 5-6, 13 (2016), https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/lone-actor-
terrorism-analysis-paper [https://perma.cc/N78A-DEWC].Accord Paul Gill et al.,
Indicators ofLone Actor Violent Events: The Problems ofLow Base Rates and Long
Observational Periods, 3(3-4) J. OF THREAT ASSESSMENT & MGMT., Vol. 3(3-4), 166, 169
(Sept. 2016). (finding that lone wolf actors from 2006 to 2013 were more likely to use the
Internet in their attack planning than lone wolf actors from 1990 to 2005).
31 Ellis, supra note 30, at 13.
32 Brynielsson et al., supra note 28.
33 Johansson et al., supra note 21, at 376.
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media text: leakage, fixation, and identification.34 The tool extracted
relevant data from social media and used keywords and natural
language processing to identify warning behaviors.35 The researchers
put the tool into operation by scanning the social media equivalent of
several million documents a day for three days.3 6 In that time, they
received 13o hits for posts suggesting violent intent and making at least
one favorable reference to bombs or weapons. 37
Another recent study bridged the gap between using social media to
predict civil unrest and studying online terrorist activity.3 8 Johnson et
al. used subject matter expertise and natural language processing to
identify online pro-ISIS groups, or "aggregates."39 Their primary
conclusions related to development, disruption, and regeneration of
aggregates.40 However, their research also showed a connection
between online aggregates and real-world events. They found that an
escalation in pro-ISIS aggregates corresponded with the ISIS assaults
on Kobani in September 2014.41 In addition, their study suggested that,
"instead of having to analyze the online activities of many millions of
34 Id. at 377. The warning behaviors are drawn from a broader body of research studying
predictors of targeted violence. Id. Leakage means "communication of intent to do harm to
a third party." Fixation means behavior "which indicates an increasing pathological
preoccupation with a person or cause." And identification means "a behavior which
indicates a desire to be a 'pseudo-commando' - i.e., have a warrior mentality, closely
associate with weapons or other military or law enforcement paraphernalia, identify with
previous attackers or assassins, or identify oneself as an agent to advance a particular
cause." Id.
35 Id. at 378, 383-84.
36 Id. at 385.
37 Id. Deploying a tool like this would not be a self-effecting warning device. Instead, it
would be used to flag high-risk individuals for review by human analysts. Id. at 378.
Because this project was merely a prototype, the researchers did not attempt to investigate
the 130 hits. They did add a filter for anti-Semitic sentiment which yielded four hits - a
"Neoconservative Right magazine, a Christian blog, and two anti-Jewish blogs." Id. at 385.
The researchers speculated that a real-world analyst who found these results would
probably take no further action unless the websites had already been flagged. Id.
38 N.F. Johnson et al., New online ecology of adversarial aggregates: ISIS and beyond,
SCIENCE, June 2016, at 1459.
39 Id. at 1460.
4o Id. at 1462.
41 Id. at 1461.
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individual potential actors worldwide, interested parties can shift their
focus to aggregates, of which there will typically be only a few
hundred."42 By suggesting both predictive value and a manageable
dataset, this study offers some hope for predictive surveillance as a tool
in the fight against terrorism.
In addition to using online behavior to predict real-world terrorist
attacks, researchers may also use online behavior to predict cyber-
attacks. One way to predict cyber-attacks is to study the online
characteristics of websites that have and have not suffered attacks in
the past. Researchers at Carnegie Mellon did just that when they
trained a classification algorithm to predict which websites would be
subject to cyber-attacks.43 A second approach is to analyze the
transactional data itself to identify patterns in the cyber-attacks. For
example, MIT researchers developed a tool that predicts cyber-attacks
by analyzing online transactions with potential cyber-attack targets.44
A third approach significantly expands the types of data one might
analyze to predict cyber-attacks. For example, the Intelligence
Advanced Research Projects Activity runs a program called "CAUSE,"
which funds research on using "unconventional" signals to predict
cyberattacks.45 In one such project, researchers at the Rochester
Institute of Technology developed a classifier to predict cyber-attacks
based on references to the target company and to cyber-attacks in
general on Twitter as well as in databases of world media coverage.4 6
42 Id. at 1463.
43 Patrick Howell O'Neill, Carnegie Mellon researchers create Big Data tool to predict
cyberattacks, DAILY DOT (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.dailydot.com/debug/website-hack-
prediction-big-data-carnegie-mellon/ [https://perma.cC/27LY-Y5K4].
44 Kalyan Veeramachaneni et al.,A12: Training a Big Data Machine to Defend, 2016 IEEE
INT. CONF. BIGDATASECURITY, HPSC, & IDS 49-52 (2016)
http://dx.doi.org/o.11o9/BigDataSecurity-HPSC-IDS.2ol6.79 [https://perma.cc/YVN4-
RDZV].
45 Cyber-Attack Automated Unconventional Sensor Environment (CAUSE), OFFICE OF THE
DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-
programs/cause/cause-baa [https://perma.cc/VN2Z-2CLY].
46 AHmEr OKUTAN ET AL., PREDICTING CYBER ATTACKS WITH BAYESIAN NETWORKS USING
UNCONVENTIONAL SIGNALS §§ 1, 2.1, http://dx.doi.org/1o.1145/3o64814.3o64823
[https://perma.cc/X9YT-3AFQ] (presented at Cyber and Information Security Research
Conference 2017). The researchers gathered data on the total number and type of global
cyberattacks each day from Hackmageddon.com, which provides global cyber-attack
statistics. Id. The researchers also drew world events data from GDELT, the "Global
Database of Events, Language, and Tone." Id. The GDELT Project "monitors the world's
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Other CAUSE-funded research considers unconventional predictors
such as black market prices for malware and internet search queries
that may show attackers trying to map IP lists to plan their attack
strategy. 47
In sum, although predictive surveillance faces significant technical
challenges, there is reason to believe that researchers will overcome
them in at least some applications.
B. The Political Viability ofPredictive Surveillance as a Counter-
Terrorism and Law Enforcement Tool
Based on recent backlashes after secret surveillance programs came
to light, predictive surveillance would face significant public resistance.
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, public sentiment
was as favorable as one could imagine toward government surveillance.
The resulting shock and fear muted public opposition to the USA
PATRIOT Act's expanded surveillance powers.48 Yet just two years
later, politicians and the public expressed outrage after learning of a
research project within the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) called "Total Information Awareness."49 Total
broadcast, print, and web news from nearly every corner of every country in over 100
languages and identifies the people, locations, organizations, counts, themes, sources,
emotions, counts, quotes, images and events driving our global society every second of
every day, creating a free open platform for computing on the entire world." Intro, THE
GDELT PROJECT, http://gdeltproject.org [https://perma.cc/SFS3-8KT8].
47 Elisabeth Eaves, IARPA Director Jason Matheny advances tech tools for US espionage,
73 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists no. 2, 2017, at 67, 72,
http://dx.doi.org/lo.lo8o/oo96 3 4 02.2017.1288 4 3 0 [https://perma.cc/KSN3-Y3BS].
48 Linda Greenhouse, The Clamor of a Free People, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 16, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/o9/16/weekinreview/war-zone-what-price-liberty-the-
clamor-of-a-free-people.html?mcubz=i (observing that, after September 11, 2001, the
balance between liberty and security "will now be recalibrated to reflect both new realities
and new perceptions"); Calvin Woodward, Muted after 9/11, NSA critics find their voice,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, (July 25, 2013,), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-muted-
after-911-nsa-critics-find-their-voice-2013ju125-story.html [https://perma.cc/6Y77-45D4];
Overwhelming Support for Bush, Military Response But..., PEW RES. CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE
& THE PRESS, (Sept. 19, 2001), http://www.people-press.org/2001/o9/19/american-
psyche-reeling-from-terror-attacks/ [https://perma.cc/29TC-8S521 (finding that most
survey respondents believed the average person would have to give up some freedoms to
prevent future terror attacks).
49 BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 292 (2016); SHANE
HARRIS, THE WATCHERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S SURVEILLANCE STATE 230-48 (2010).
2017] SPENCER 121
Information Awareness was the post-9/11 brainchild of John
Poindexter, the former National Security Advisor under Ronald Regan
who resigned after his role in the Iran-Contra Affair became public.o
As Poindexter envisioned it, Total Information Awareness was an "early
warning" surveillance system that would detect the digital signature
that terrorists inevitably emitted in their purchases, phone calls, and
travels.s1 The program operated out of the public spotlight as a DARPA
research project.52 When the program became public in 2003, scathing
public criticism eventually led Congress to defund the program. 53 More
recently, widespread public reaction to Edward Snowden's 2013
disclosure of the NSA's bulk telephone metadata collection program led
Congress to pass the USA FREEDOM Act and end the bulk collection
program. 54
There are, however, reasons to believe that public opposition would
not prevent the government from implementing a predictive
surveillance program that promised to be an effective counter-
terrorism or law enforcement tool. First, despite the public outcry,
Congress did not completely kill the Total Information Awareness
project. Although Congress formally defunded DARPA's Total
Information Awareness project in a 2003 appropriations bill, Congress
continued funding for significant Total Information Awareness
programs in a "classified annex" to the bill - the so-called "black
5o FRIEDMAN, supra note 49; HARRIS, supra note 49, at 65-66, 144-45.
5 HARRIS, supra note 49, at 147; John Poindexter, Overview of the Information
Awareness Office, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (Aug. 2, 2002),
https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/poindexter.html [https://perma.cc/6BGP-M4QP]. Accord
Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 317, 318 & n.6 (2008).
52 GINA MARIE STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31730 PRIVACY: TOTAL INFORMATION
AWARENESS PROGRAMS AND RELATED INFORMATION ACCESS, COLLECTION, AND PROTECTION
LAws 1 (2003), https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL3173o.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJN2-QA7U].
53 FRIEDMAN, supra note 49; DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY 183-84 (2016).
54 LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE
IN A DIGITAL AGE 48-52 (2016).
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budget."5 Those programs moved out of DARPA to the National
Security Agency's Advance Research and Development Activity. 56
In addition, the federal government is sponsoring significant
research efforts geared to predict both large-scale societal events like
protests and small-scale events like terrorist activity. The Intelligence
Advanced Research Projects Activity ("LARPA") is a research-funding
entity within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.57 One
major LARPA research initiative is "Anticipatory Intelligence," which
"focuses on characterizing and reducing uncertainty by providing
decision makers with timely and accurate forecasts of significant global
events."58
Several active IARPA research programs are laying the groundwork
for predictive surveillance, though they are not yet focused on
predicting individual terrorist activity. The Mercury program is trying
to develop "continuous, automated analysis of foreign [signals
intelligence] data to anticipate and/or detect significant events,
including military and terrorist activities, political crises and disease
outbreaks."5 Mercury builds on a past program called Open Source
Indicators (OSI), which sought to develop "methods for continuous,
automated analysis of publicly available data in order to anticipate
and/or detect significant societal events, such as political crises,
humanitarian crises, mass violence, riots, mass migrations, disease
outbreaks, economic instability, resource shortages, and responses to
-s HARRIS, supra note 49, at 247; SOLOVE, supra note 53, at 184-85. By the time Congress
defunded the DARPA version of the program, the administration had changed its name to
the less ominous "Terrorism Information Awareness" program. HARRIS, supra note 49, at
240, 247.
56 FRIEDMAN, supra note 49; HARRIS, supra note 49, at 244, 247, 251-53.
57 About IARPA, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE,
https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/about-iarpa [https://perma.cc/FS5Y-DW4Z].
58 Anticipatory Intelligence, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE,
https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/about-iarpa/anticipatory-intelligence
[https://perma.ce/ZR99-WPU2].
59 Mercury, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE,
https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs/mercury [https://perma.ce/BH5P-
X8VJ].
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natural disasters." 60 Similarly, IARPA's Cyber-attack Automated
Unconventional Sensor Environment (CAUSE) program seeks to
develop "new automated methods that forecast and detect cyber-
attacks significantly earlier than existing methods." 61 CAUSE seeks to
use "earlier attack phases, such as target reconnaissance, planning, and
delivery," to "enable warning of significant cyber events prior to their
most damaging phases." 62
LARPA's OSI project yielded an automated system that predicts
significant societal events based on open-source data. The system,
Early Model-Based Event Recognition using Surrogates (EMBERS),
generates real-time forecasts of significant societal events such as civil
unrest, disease outbreaks, elections, and domestic political crises.63
EMBERS forecasts include predictions of the day, location, type of
event, and participating population.64 To forecast civil unrest, EMBERS
relies on social media data, Wikipedia, news, blogs, and economic
data.65 EMBERS has successfully forecast civil unrest in Brazil,
Venezuela, Mexico, Columbia, and Paraguay.66
Other researchers working on an IARPA grant took a simpler
approach to predicting civil protests across Latin America from 2011 to
2014. They found that, by calculating both the volume and the rate of
change in the volume of certain keywords related to protests, they could
use Google Trends data to predict street protests one week in advance. 67
60 Open Source Indicators, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE,
https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs/osi [https://perma.ce/7J9W-
XUXQ].
61 Cyber-attack Automated Unconventional Sensor Environment, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF
NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-progranis/cause
[https://perma.cc/WCL5-7DYF].
62 Id.
63 NAREN RAMAKRISHNAN ET AL., MODEL-BASED FORECASTING OF SIGNIFICANT SOCIETAL
EVENTS 86 (IEEE Intelligent SystemS 2015).
64 Id. at 86.
6s Id. at 87.
6 6 Sathappan Muthiah et al., EMBERS at 4 years: Experiences operating an Open Source
Indicators Forecasting System, in PROC. OF THE 22ND ACM SIGKDD INT'L CONF. ON
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 205, 208-10 (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/lo.1145/29396 7 2.2939709 [https://perma.cc/8SAH-ZGW8].
67 Hong Qi et al., Open source data reveals connection between online and on-street
protest activity, 5 EPJ DATA SCI. vol. 18, 2016, at 1, 3-4,
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LARPA is not the only government agency funding research into
predicting terrorism. Horizon 2020, the European Union's research
funding initiative, funds a wide array of programs intended to secure
Europe's global competitiveness and security.68 Horizon 2020's most
recent call for proposals sought projects that would generate "policy
recommendations and tools aimed at improving their ability to prevent
and detect radicalization by national and local security practitioners in
a timely manner, i.e. before individuals turn towards violent, criminal
or terrorists [sic] acts." 69
Given the extent of the prediction-based research agenda and the
critical nature of the terrorist threat, the government would likely find
the political will to implement predictive surveillance if it were a
promising tool. It is less clear whether the public would tolerate the use
of predictive surveillance for ordinary law enforcement, though the
public might accept a program focused on predicting mass shootings
and other high-casualty crimes. To be sure, government will always
have incentives to expand its use of investigative tools, and limiting
investigatory techniques to specific crimes may be challenging.
However, as predictive analytics takes even deeper root in individuals'
lives, some segments of the public may come to believe that terrorism
and even some general crime prevention efforts should benefit from the
same analytical tools as marketers, insurers, and financial institutions.
The balance of this Article, therefore, discusses how existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine might accommodate predictive surveillance and
assesses the extent to which these accommodations threaten to
destabilize Fourth Amendment doctrine itself. This Article identifies
the narrowest possible way to authorize predictive surveillance so that
it does not become the thin edge of the wedge that pries open Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
https://epjdatascience.springeropen.com/articles/lo.114o/epjds/sl3688-ox6-oo8l-5
[https://perma.cc/PRQ6-YK5J].
68 What is Horizon 2020?, EUR. COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon202O/en/what-horizon-2020
[http://perma.cc/QBK6-MKAE].
69 Horizon 2020 Work Programme 2016-17,14. Secure societies - Protecting freedom and
security ofEurope and its citizens, EuR. COMM'N 1, 23 (2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h202O/wp/2o16_2O17/main/h2O20-
wp1617-security en.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3ZL-22A6].
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III. PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE AND THE THREAT TO EXISTING
SURVEILLANCE REGULATION
Predictive surveillance does not fit the existing model of
surveillance regulation. Nevertheless, given the high stakes of
surveillance programs promising to prevent domestic terrorism and
serious crimes, courts will feel pressure to authorize the programs. That
pressure may lead courts to distort Fourth Amendment doctrine itself.
This Part discusses why predictive surveillance poses such a threat and
shows how past courts twisted seemingly-plain statutory language to
accommodate mass surveillance.
Two factors contribute to the threat that predictive surveillance
poses to existing surveillance law. The first factor is the lack of
individualized suspicion at the data collection phase, which puts
predictive surveillance at odds with the existing frameworks of
surveillance regulation. Existing surveillance law first evaluates
whether the government can demonstrate sufficient suspicion about
the surveillance target. For example, the traditional Fourth
Amendment search and seizure analysis asks whether the target of the
search enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy.7o Similarly, before
the government can intercept wire or electronic communications, the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act requires the government to
show probable cause to believe that the target has committed or will
commit a specified offense.71 Under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, the government must demonstrate that the
surveillance target is "a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."72
And even under FISA's more permissive business records provision, the
government must still demonstrate reasonable grounds that the
records it seeks are "relevant to an authorized investigation" to obtain
foreign intelligence information or to protect against international
terrorism.73
Predictive surveillance, however, rests on the opposite premise. At
the point of collection the government has no suspicion about any
particular subject. Instead, the goal is to collect all of the data, identify
70 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
71 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2012).
72 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A) (2012).
73 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012).
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predictive patterns, and use those patterns later to prevent future
terrorist or criminal activity.74 The current approach to surveillance
regulation cannot accommodate a predictive surveillance model in
which the first step is to analyze all the data for patterns that could later
yield individualized suspicion.
The second factor contributing to the threat that predictive
surveillance poses to existing surveillance law is the emotional appeal
of pro-surveillance arguments. Unsurprisingly, surveillance
proponents frame their arguments in stark terms emphasizing the dire
consequences of a terrorist attack.75 These arguments have deep
emotional appeal. Recall the effect of National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice's warning before the second Iraq war about the risk
that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction: "We do
not want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud."76 As former NSA
General Counsel Stuart Baker recognized just months after 9/11, "If
using more intrusive technology is the only way to prevent horrible
crimes, chances are that we'll decide to use that technology, and then
adjust our sense of what is private and what is not."77 Charlie Savage's
coverage of post-9/11 surveillance regulation proved Baker correct.
Savage observed that "[t]he history of the FISA Court revealed after the
Snowden leaks showed that it often seemed to rubber-stamp what the
NSA wanted to do."78
These two risk factors likely led the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court to twist the language of the USA PATRIOT Act
beyond recognition in order to approve the NSA's bulk telephone
74 See Shaun B. Spencer, When Targeting Becomes Secondary: A Framework for
Regulating Predictive Surveillance in Anti-Terrorism Investigations, 92 DENV. U. L. REV.
493,504 (2015).
75 See Shaun B. Spencer, Security Versus Privacy: Reframing the Debate, 79 DENV. U. L.
REV. 519,519 (2002).
76 Wolf Blitzer, Search for the 'Smoking Gun', CNN.coM (Jan. 10, 2003),
http://www.cnn.com/2oo3/US/oi/1o/wbr.smoking.gun/ [http://perma.cc/G8FU-8988].
77 David Streitfeld & Charles Piller, Big Brother Finds Ally in Once-Wary High Tech, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 19, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/jan/19/news/mn-23644
[https://perma.cc/K6PF-58GT].
78 CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS 573 (2015). For example, after excoriating the
government for systemically violating FISC-imposed rules for handling the bulk email
program (Section 702), the FISC nevertheless granted the NSA's request to restart the
program (which had lapsed after systematic violations) and to "collect and use the wider
swath of information going forward." Id. at 564-65.
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metadata collection program. Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Act,79 the government may not obtain an order to produce business
records without showing "reasonable grounds to believe that the
tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation . .. to
obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States
person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities."80 In 2006, in an effort to find statutory authority
for the bulk telephone metadata collection program that the Bush
administration began after 9/11, the government sought a Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court order directing telecommunication
companies to provide bulk call detail records pursuant to Section 215.81
The government argued that all of the call detail records were relevant
because the NSA could not conduct metadata analysis unless it first
collected all of the data.82 The FISC granted the government's
application in an order that contained no legal analysis.8 3 The FISC
repeatedly reauthorized the government's applications over the next
eight years, although no FISC judge offered any legal analysis until after
Edward Snowden revealed the existence of the program and the FISC's
authorization. 84
The FISC's secret interpretation strained the term "relevant"
beyond recognition. First, interpreting relevance to include data on
79 USA PATRIOT Act § 215,50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
so 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A).
81 PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 21-22, (2014)
(hereinafter "PCLOB REPORT"), available at http://www.pclob.gov/Library/215-
Report-on-the TelephoneRecordsProgram.pdf [https://perma.cc/XT4G-F9D3]
[hereinafter PCLOB REPORT].
82 PCLOB REPORT, supra note 81, at 43.
83 In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 06-05 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pubMay%2024%202oo6%2oOrder%20fr
om%2oFISC.pdf [http://perma.cc/5W5N-K6ZQ].
84 In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) (amended
memorandum opinion), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/BR%2013-
109%200rder-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VFD7-YQ8G].
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every telephone call rendered the term meaningless.85 Second, the text
of Section 215 itself included three illustrations of records that were
"presumptively relevant to an authorized investigation": records
pertaining to (1) a foreign power or agent thereof, (2) activities of a
suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of the authorized
investigation, and (3) an individual in contact with or known to such a
suspected agent of a foreign power. 86 None of these examples are
consistent with so broad an interpretation of the term "relevant."
Finally, the drafter of the USA PATRIOT Act, former Republican House
member James Sensenbrenner, confirmed that Congress intended to
prevent the government from using Section 215 to engage in bulk
collection.87
Predictive surveillance will present an even stronger motivation for
shoehorning bulk collection into the traditional surveillance regulation
model. The NSA bulk telephone metadata collection program offered
the government a fallback position. Rather than collecting all of the
data from the telecommunications providers in advance, the
government could instead have made individual requests from each
provider about each subject of interest. In fact, that is precisely the
approach that Congress took in the post-Snowden reform legislation.
The USA FREEDOM Act prohibited bulk collection under Section 215,
and instead required the government to conduct its "contact chaining"
analysis by obtaining records on a case-by-case basis directly from the
telecommunications companies.88 For predictive analytics, however,
there is no such fallback position. Either the government collects all of
the data, or it cannot conduct the analysis.
Hard cases often make bad law, and evaluating predictive
surveillance under the existing surveillance regulation framework will
likely present a very hard case. The rest of this Article discusses the
avenues that courts could take to authorize the bulk collection required
85 See Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional
Considerations, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 757,841 (2014) ("It would be impossible to
establish that all customer and subscriber records pertain to a foreign power or an agent
thereof, or to a particular, suspected agent of the same, who is the subject of an authorized
investigation. Perhaps five or ten customers may fall into this category, but to include
millions simply pushes the bounds of common sense. Accordingly, the telephony metadata
are neither relevant nor presumptively relevant.").
86 USA PATRIOT Act § 215,50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012).
87 Brief Amicus Curiae of Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. in Support of
Plaintiffs at 2-4, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (No. 13 Civ. 3994 (WHP)).
88 USA FREEDOM Act § 103,50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
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for predictive surveillance and analyzes which of those avenues would
least disrupt Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
IV. PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE AND THE THIRD-PARTY AND PUBLIC-
ExPosuRE DOCTRINES
Part IV first summarizes the third-party and public-exposure
doctrines and identifies potential exceptions that courts have begun to
explore. Next, this Part considers the implications of the various
approaches that courts could take to apply these doctrines to the data
collection necessary for predictive surveillance.
A. The Third-Party and Public-Exposure Doctrines
The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches applies only where the court determines that an individual
enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy.89 Under the third-party
doctrine, people enjoy no expectation of privacy in information shared
with third parties, "even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed."90
Accordingly, there is no Fourth Amendment protection for information
such as telephone numbers that an individual dialed91 or bank account
records held by the bank. 92 Similarly, under the public-exposure
doctrine,93 people enjoy no expectation of privacy in information that
89 E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
90 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 752 (1971)); see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427,438 (1963)-
91 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
92 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
93 Although the Court itself does not use this label, commentators have used it to describe
cases holding that individuals lack any reasonable expectation of privacy in what they
expose to the public. See, e.g., Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means
Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance,
39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 647, 674 (1988); Jeffrey M. Skopek, Reasonable Expectations of
Anonymity, 101 VA. L. REv. 691, 709 (2015).
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they knowingly expose to the public.94 Thus, there is no Fourth
Amendment protection for one's movements along public roads (at
least when monitored over a short period of time)95 or for areas of one's
property visible from an airplane or a helicopter.9 6
The Supreme Court has wrestled with how to apply the public-
exposure doctrine to long-term location tracking. In United States v.
Jones, the thirty-day aggregation of location data about a single
individual was enough to overcome the general rule that one lacks an
expectation of privacy in one's location in public spaces. 97 The
aggregation in Jones would pale in comparison to the massive
aggregation necessary for predictive surveillance. For example, the
NSA's Section 215 bulk telephone metadata program collected and
stored five years of metadata on American telephone users' calls.98
Similarly, a national network of automated license plate readers could
create a catalog showing where every car in the country traveled for as
long as the program operated.99
In addition, Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Jones raised
questions about whether the third-party doctrine is well suited to the
digital age. 00 Although the Supreme Court has not yet tackled this
issue, a few lower courts have resisted applying the third-party doctrine
in some circumstances. For example, the Sixth Circuit held that the
third-party doctrine did not deprive an individual of a reasonable
expectation of privacy in emails stored in the hands of an email
94 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
95 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 418-19 (2012) (Alito, J. & Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983).
96 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15 (1986); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451(1989).
97 Jones, 565 U.S. at 413-17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring).
98 Scott Shane, N.S.A. Violated Rules on Use ofPhone Logs, Intelligence Court Found in
2009, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2013, at A14.
99 For a discussion of widespread uses of automatic license plate readers, see generally
ACLU, You ARE BEING TRACKED: How LICENSE PLATE READERS ARE BEING USED TO
RECORD AMERICANS' MOVEMENTS 7-15 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/o71613-
aclu-alprreport-opt-vo5.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZXT4-WJCB].
100 Jones, 565 U.S. at 417-18.
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service,1oI and the Ninth Circuit held that the mere fact that others had
occasional access a computer connected to a university network did not
deprive the computer user of a reasonable expectation of privacy.102
Given the narrow circumstances of Jones, the Supreme Court has wide
latitude to decide how to apply the third-party and public-exposure
doctrines to any type of mass surveillance.
With its recent grant of certiorari in United States v. Carpenter, the
Court is poised to decide whether the third-party doctrine applies to
gathering long-term cell site location information from a cellular
telephone provider.103 The Carpenter decision could significantly
impact how future courts approach predictive surveillance. If the Court
holds that long-term CSLI collection does not fall within the third-party
doctrine, that would make it more difficult for courts to find predictive
analytics data collection to fall within the third-party doctrine. On the
other hand, even a holding that long-term CSLI collection falls within
the third-party doctrine would not necessarily compel the same
decision for mass surveillance given the far broader scope of data
collection at issue.
B. A Sweeping Approach to Predictive Surveillance Under the Third-
Party and Public-Exposure Doctrines
The simplest way to approve predictive surveillance would be a
literal application of the third-party and public-exposure doctrines.
Under such an approach, the court would reason that any information
shared with third parties or exposed to the public is unprotected under
the Fourth Amendment, no matter how long-term or pervasive the
surveillance.
The only opinions to date applying the third-party doctrine to mass
surveillance involve challenges to the NSA's bulk telephone metadata
collection program. Both the Southern District of New York and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court held that the third-party
doctrine shielded the bulk metadata collection program from Fourth
rol United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286-8 7 (6th Cir. 2010).
102 United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 114 6-47 (9th Cir. 2007).
103 United States v. Carpenter, 819 F-3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211
(2017).
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Amendment scrutiny.1o4 In ACLU v. Clapper, Judge Pauley of the
Southern District of New York rejected the idea that bulk collection of
telephone metadata distinguished the case from the handful of phone
numbers dialed in Smith v. Maryland: "The collection of breathtaking
amounts of information unprotected by the Fourth Amendment does
not transform that sweep into a Fourth Amendment search."105 Judge
Pauley also rejected the ACLU's argument that the database gave the
government a "rich mosaic" of each person's life.1o 6 Judge Pauley
reasoned that merely collecting the numbers did not paint that mosaic
because the government cannot query the database without tying that
query to an approved target. 07 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court took a similar approach when it approved orders implementing
the Section 215 bulk telephone metadata collection program.o8
104 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 785 F.3d 787,
826 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that Section 215 did not authorize bulk collection); In re
Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *2-3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
105 Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 752. This sentiment, however, ignores the approach of five
Justices in United States v. Jones. For those justices, short-term tracking of one's public
movements did not trigger the Fourth Amendment, but long-term tracking of those same
movements did. Jones, 565 U.S. at 418-19, 431 (Alito, J., concurring joined by Ginsburg,
Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Alito
that long-term GPS tracking violates the Fourth Amendment's reasonable expectation of
privacy).
i06 Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 750-51.
107 Id. at 750-51.
108 See, In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things
from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *2-3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). The
circuit courts never had to reach the Fourth Amendment issue because Section 215 sunset
on June 1, 2015, and was replaced by the USA FREEDOM Act, which prohibits bulk
collection and takes effect on November 28, 2015. See Uniting and Strengthening America
by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268; In re Application of the FBI, Bankr. No. 15-75, 2015 WL
5637562, at *4-5 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015). The only circuit courts to consider the bulk
telephone metadata program ruled on other grounds. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F-3d 787, 821
(2d Cir. 2015) (rejecting government's proposed interpretation of term "relevant" in
Section 215); Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 56 8 , 570 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (vacating
preliminary injunction based on plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate likelihood of success on
standing issue).
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On the other hand, in Klayman v. Obama,1o9 Judge Leon reasoned
that "the evolutions in the Government's surveillance capabilities,
citizens' phone habits, and the relationship between the NSA and
telecom companies" justified distinguishing Smith v. Maryland.11o He
relied in part on the fact that the NSA's bulk collection constituted a
massive aggregation of data."' In this regard, he analogized to United
States v. Jones,112 where five concurring Justices emphasized the
significance of aggregating an individual's GPS data.113 Judge Leon
applied the same aggregation idea to distinguish Smith v. Maryland.
The pen register in Smith only tracked a single defendant's telephone
metadata for a day,"4 but the Section 215 bulk collection program built
a comprehensive, five-year record of Americans' phone calls.115 For
Judge Leon, this was a difference not merely in degree, but in kind.116
If the Court held that predictive surveillance data collection fell
within the third-party and public-exposure doctrines, that would
dramatically expand those doctrines. There would be nothing other
than political opposition to prevent the government from collecting
every scrap of data visible to the public or shared with a third party. The
risk of such unbridled surveillance power appeared to give Chief Justice
Roberts pause at oral argument in Jones, when he asked the
government whether accepting its argument meant that the
government was free to place GPS trackers on the justices' cars.n7 Given
1o Obama v. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated on other grounds, 8oo
F.3d 559, 56o (D.C. Cir. 2015) (vacating preliminary injunction based on plaintiffs' failure
to demonstrate likelihood of success on standing issue).
11old. at 31.
unId. at 32.
m United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
113 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 31 (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 415-18 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring)); Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring joined by Ginsburg, Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
114 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
115 Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32.
116 Id. at 32-33, 37-
117 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9:18 to 10:30, United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064
(2011) (No. 10-1259) (Roberts, C.J.),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument-transcripts/1o -1259.pdf
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the Court's concerns about data aggregation on a much smaller scale in
Jones and Riley,118 there is reason to believe that the Court would shy
away from this most extreme avenue to approving predictive
surveillance.
C. A More Nuanced Approach to Predictive Surveillance and the
Third-Party and Public-Exposure Doctrines
A more nuanced approach would recognize that, at a minimum, the
massive data aggregation required by predictive surveillance should
override the third-party and public-exposure doctrines. This Article
proposes that the third-party doctrine should not apply to the type of
bulk collection necessary for predictive analytics. As I have argued
elsewhere, the third-party doctrine is flawed because it represents an
"all or nothing" approach to privacy that ignores reality in several
significant ways.119
First, the third-party doctrine fails to distinguish third parties as
ends from third parties as means.12 0 In the case that spawned the third-
party doctrine, United States v. Miller, 121 the Court relied on its earlier
"misplaced trust" cases.1 2 2 Under those cases, the Court warned that
people who share information with acquaintances take a risk that those
acquaintances may abuse their trust and tell others, including the
police.123 But by extending that logic to the telephone numbers dialed
in Smith v. Maryland, 124 the Court ignored the difference between ends
and means. In the misplaced trust cases, the communication to an
[https://perma.cc/TU8F-5NJ9].
118 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring &
Sotomayor, J., concurring); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). For a
discussion of the role of aggregation in Jones and Riley, see infra text at notes 128-37.
119 Shaun B. Spencer, The Surveillance Society and the Third-Party Privacy Problem, 65
S.C. L. REV. 373, 401 (2013).
2old. at 401-02.
12 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
122 Id. at 443-44 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971); Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963).
123 White, 401 U.S. at 751-52; Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302; Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438.
4 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-46 (1979).
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untrustworthy acquaintance is both the end and the means. But the
telephone company's record of the numbers that its customers dialed is
merely the means to a different end-the communication with an
acquaintance.125
Second, the third-party doctrine ignores what I have called the
"anti-aggregation norm."2 6 This visceral, societal fear of pervasive
surveillance is a common theme in both literature and legal
commentary.1 2 7 And it figured prominently in Riley v. California, 128
where the Court rejected law enforcement's attempt to apply the search
incident to arrest doctrine to cell phone data.129 Under that doctrine,
when law enforcement officers arrest a suspect, they may search
personal property on the arrestee's person or within his immediate
control without a warrant.130 This exception to the probable cause
requirement exists (1) to protect the arresting officers from harm and
(2) to prevent the destruction of evidence. 13 The Court refused to apply
the exception to cell phones for two reasons. First, the Court reasoned
that searching a cell phone would not serve the doctrine's purposes
because a cell phone neither threatens officer safety nor triggers a need
to preserve evidence.132 Second, the Court reasoned that the vast
aggregation of data found within a cell phone rendered a cell phone
search far more intrusive than a physical search of objects on one's
person.133
125 See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 861-63 (Mass. 2014) (citing State v.
Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 587 (2013)) (refusing to apply the third-party doctrine to cell site
location information because individuals do not intend to voluntarily transmit their
location to the cell service provider when making a call and location information bears no
relation to the communicative purpose of the call).
-6 Spencer, Surveillance Society, supra note 119, at 402-03 (discussing privacy themes in
George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four and Franz Kafka's The Trial).
127Id.
128 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
129Id. at 2485.
1301d. at 2482-84.
13Id. at 2483-84.
12 Id. at 2485-87.
33 Id. at 2489.
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The anti-aggregation norm also lies at the heart of the concurring
opinions that rejected long-term, warrantless GPS tracking in United
States v. Jones. Justice Alito recognized that short-term location
monitoring would not violate one's reasonable expectation of privacy.
However, when the tracking lasted for four weeks, this long-term
tracking exceeded one's reasonable expectation of privacy because
"society's expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others
would not - and indeed, in the main, simply could not - secretly
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's car for
a very long period."134 And Justice Sotomayor reasoned that people
should not have to "expect that their movements will be recorded and
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more
or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so
on."13 Although Riley and Jones answered different legal questions,13 6
they both relied on the notion that the aggregation of data can give rise
to Fourth Amendment protection, even if the individual data points
would not merit such protection. For that reason, commentators have
characterized both Riley and the Jones concurrences as evoking the
mosaic theory, which is "premised on aggregation [in that] it considers
whether a set of non-searches aggregated together amount to a search
because their collection and subsequent analysis creates a revealing
mosaic."37
-4United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 415(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with Justice Alito that long-term monitoring violates
one's expectation of privacy).
s35 Id. at 415-16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846,
862-63 (Mass. 2014) (declining to apply the third-party doctrine to cell site location data
obtained from a cell phone provider and reasoning that "even CSLI limited to the cell site
locations of telephone calls made and received'may yield a treasure trove of very detailed
and extensive information about the individual's 'comings and goings' in both public and
private places").
136 Indeed, in Riley, the Court declined to address "whether the collection or inspection of
aggregated digital information amounts to a search under other circumstances [than a
search incident to arrest]." Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489-90 n.i.
137 Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311,320
(2012). For the proposition that both Riley and the Jones concurrences invoke the mosaic
theory, see Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations ofPrivacy,
Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. Cr. REV. 205, 206-o8
(noting that both Riley and the Jones concurrences "talk about privacy in mosaic-theory
terms"); Ric Simmons, The Missed Opportunities ofRiley v. Calhfornia, 12 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 253, 2622-64 (2014) ("[i]n both Jones and Riley, the Court is getting close to
adopting the'mosaic theory"); Robert Greenleaf Brice & Katrina L. Sifferd, Domestic
Drone Surveillance: The Court's Epistemic Challenge and Wittgenstein'sActional
136 [Vol. 14-1
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Finally, the third-party doctrine rests on a flawed assumption that
the third-party disclosure assumes the risk of further disclosure.3 8 In
United States v. Miller, the Court relied on the notion that bank and
telephone customers voluntarily assume the risk that third parties will
disclose their information.139 Even if this reasoning justified an all-
encompassing third-party doctrine four decades ago, it does not hold
true today. First, consumers do not have a meaningful choice about
whether to use services that involve sharing data with third parties. 140
And second, even if consumers did have a choice, they would lack the
information needed to exercise that choice.141
Given the risks posed by mass surveillance, courts should not put
predictive surveillance beyond constitutional reach by holding that it
falls within the third-party and public-exposure doctrines. Such a
sweeping approach would entrench the third-party and public-
exposure doctrines in every conceivable context. Even for courts
predisposed to approve predictive surveillance, the sounder approach
would be to refuse to apply the third-party and public-exposure
doctrines and instead adopt one of the reasonableness approaches
discussed below. This would give courts more control over when
Certainty, 77 LA. L. REV. 805, 827 (2017) (noting that Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in
Jones and the Riley opinion reflect the mosaic theory). Riley, of course, did not rely solely
on the mosaic theory. Riley also noted that cell phones are likely to hold uniquely personal
types of data such as internet search and browsing history, historic location information,
and other detailed information about one's life, and that cell phones also provide access to
vast amounts of data stored in the cloud rather than on the device itself. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at
2490-91. In addition, although Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Jones explicitly invoked
the mosaic theory, Justice Alito's concurrence may be read more narrowly. Jones, 565 U.S.
at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). He did not rely explicitly on the portrait of one's life that four
weeks of location tracking could yield. Id. Instead, he drew a purely expectation-based
distinction by reasoning that people expect law enforcement to engage in short-term but
not long-term location tracking. Id.
138 Spencer, supra note 119, at 404-05.
139 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).
140 Spencer, supra note 119, at 404-05. Justice Marshall advanced precisely this argument
in Smith v. Maryland, albeit unsuccessfully. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 73535, 749-50
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some
notion of choice... . [H]ere, unless a person is prepared to forego use of what for many has
become a personal or professional necessity [i.e., the telephone], he cannot help but accept
the risk of surveillance. It is idle to speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts where, as a
practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.") (citations omitted).
141 Spencer, supra note 119, at 405-o6.
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predictive surveillance was or was not justified, while also allowing the
third-party and public-exposure doctrines to adapt to the digital era.
Accordingly, the next Part considers how courts could apply the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement to predictive surveillance.
V. PREDICTIVE SURVEILLANCE AND THE REASONABLENESS
REQUIREMENT
This Part discusses how future judicial approval of predictive
surveillance could affect the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
requirement. It first summarizes the reasonableness requirement and
the general rule that reasonableness demands a warrant issued upon
probable cause. Next, it discusses several different exceptions to the
warrant requirement and considers the implications of relying on each
exception to authorize predictive surveillance.
A. The Reasonableness Requirement
In the law enforcement context, reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment generally requires that officers obtain a warrant supported
by probable cause that the search will reveal evidence of a particular
crime.142 The Supreme Court, however, has developed numerous
exceptions to the warrant requirement.143 Although these exceptions
vary in their particulars, they each purport to apply the Fourth
Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable.144
To assess reasonableness, courts balance the government's interest in
the search against the nature of the intrusion on individual liberties.145
The reasonableness analysis highlights the difference between
traditional and predictive surveillance. Even where the Court does not
142 E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-15 (1984).
3 Examples of these exceptions include searches incident to lawful arrest, plain view
searches, searches in exigent circumstances, inventory searches, and administrative
searches. David C. Behar, An Exception to an Exception: Officer Inadvertence as a
Requirement to Plain View Seizures in the Computer Context, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471,
472(2012).
4 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIELJ. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 32 (9th ed.
2010) ("When an exception to the warrant requirement is applicable, only the
reasonableness requirement must be satisfied.").
14 E.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426-27 (2004); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 24
(1968).
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require a warrant issued upon probable cause, the reasonableness
requirement usually demands some degree of individualized
suspicion.14 6 Predictive surveillance by its nature is incompatible with
the warrant and probable cause standard because, by definition, the
government has no particularized suspicion about the subjects of the
surveillance. In theory, courts could simply reason that there is neither
probable cause nor even reasonable suspicion for bulk data collection,
and therefore predictive surveillance can never meet the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement. Such a dogmatic approach
seems highly unlikely as well as unduly restrictive if the technology has
the potential to deter terrorism or crime. Therefore, courts predisposed
to authorize some form of predictive surveillance are likely to rely on or
expand existing exceptions to the warrant requirement.
B. A Terry-Style Exception to the Warrant and Probable Cause
Requirement for Predictive Surveillance
The most sweeping doctrinal approach to finding predictive
surveillance reasonable would carve out an exception similar to the stop
and frisk exception in Terry v. Ohio.47 Although the stop and frisk
shares almost nothing in common with predictive surveillance, the
techniques do share one feature from the perspective of Fourth
Amendment law: neither fits neatly into the traditional categories of
Fourth Amendment doctrine. Just as the Supreme Court created an
exception to bridge that doctrinal disconnect in Terry, courts could
create a similar exception for predictive surveillance.
In Terry, the Court considered how to apply the Fourth
Amendment to the stop and frisk, a technique in which an officer stops
a suspect for questioning and frisks the person if he has reason to
believe the suspect is armed.148 The technique did not fit neatly into the
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine when the Court first confronted
146 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31 (requiring reasonable belief that criminal activity is afoot
and suspect is armed before conducting stop and frisk); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
340-41(1985) (requiring reasonable grounds to suggest student violation of law or school
rules before searching student); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537-38 (1967)
(requiring some reason such as passage of time, type of building, or condition of
neighborhood before conducting housing code inspection).
147 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
148 Id. at 10.
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it.149 The defendant argued that the police could not stop and frisk him
without a warrant based on probable cause. 50 Yet the Court recognized
that the stop and frisk took place in circumstances where obtaining a
warrant was impractical.'s' The government argued that the stop and
frisk did not constitute a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.152 Yet, such a categorical approach would have placed
significant police infringements on individual freedom beyond
constitutional regulation.53
The Court rejected a "rigid all-or-nothing model" of the Fourth
Amendment's4 and instead adopted a compromise grounded in the
reasonableness determination.'s That reasonableness determination
required the Court to balance the government's interest against the
nature of the intrusion on individual rights.15 6 Terry and its progeny
treated the initial detention as a Fourth Amendment seizure and the
weapons frisk as a Fourth Amendment search, 157 but the Court created
a lower standard of individualized suspicion to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement.5 8 The initial detention
does not require probable cause; instead, the officer need only have
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity "may be afoot."159 In light of
the law enforcement interest in investigating crime, the brief
'49 Id. at 9-10; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.1(a) (5th ed. 2016) ("what the police viewed as a distinct procedure did
not fit comfortably within any extant legal pigeonhole").
15o Terry, 392 U.S. at 11.
151 Id. at 20.
152 Id. at io.
153 See, id. at 17 & n.15.
14 Id. at 17.
15s Id. at 18-19.
156 Id. at 21, 24, 27.
157 Id. at 19; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972).
i58 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
'59 Id.
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investigatory stop is reasonable.160 Similarly, the weapons frisk does
not require probable cause; instead, the officer must have reasonable
grounds to believe the suspect is armed.1 61 Although the weapons frisk
is a significant intrusion, that intrusion is reasonable in light of the
government's interest in officer safety.1 62
Courts confronting predictive surveillance for the first time may
take a similar approach to the stop and frisk in Terry. Had the Terry
Court required probable cause, it would have rendered nearly all stop
and frisks unconstitutional. Similarly, requiring the government to
demonstrate particularized suspicion before undertaking predictive
surveillance would effectively ban predictive surveillance because
predictive surveillance, by definition, lacks particularized suspicion.
Following Terry's model, courts could balance the governmental
interest in predictive surveillance against the nature of the intrusion.
As to the governmental interest, courts could require the government
to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that predictive surveillance
would reveal terrorist or criminal activity.1 6 3 Such a requirement would
be analogous to Terry's requirement of reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot. Absent such a requirement, the government's
asserted interest would be speculative and should not justify an
intrusion on individual liberty.
Courts could characterize the nature of the intrusion several
different ways. For a broad exception sanctioning predictive
surveillance for both counter-terrorism and law enforcement, courts
could rely on the fact that the government was collecting information
shared with third parties or exposed to the public. Thus, courts would
treat the privacy interest as diminished under the circumstances. Such
an approach would still credit the notion of assumption of risk
underlying the third-party and public-exposure doctrines, but it would
not take the drastic position that such information enjoys no Fourth
Amendment protection no matter how pervasive the government's data
collection practices.
On the other hand, courts could create a narrow exception by
emphasizing the massive aggregation of data that predictive
surveillance would entail. Just as the aggregation of data heightened
6
o Adams, 407 U.S. at 146.
161 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
162 Id. at 26; Adams, 407 U.S. at 146.
163 See Spencer, supra note 1o, at 528.
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the degree of intrusion in Jones and Riley, the aggregation of data about
the entire population - even data shared with third parties or exposed
to the general public - would constitute a serious intrusion on
individual liberty. In the face of so substantial an intrusion, courts
might find predictive surveillance to be reasonable only if the data use
were limited to anti-terrorism investigations, or possibly to criminal
activity that threatened mass casualties. There is at least some recent
support for such an approach. In United States v. Jones, where five
justices reasoned that long-term, warrantless GPS tracking violated the
Fourth Amendment, Justice Alito's concurrence observed that long-
term GPS tracking might nevertheless be permissible to investigate
"extraordinary offenses." 164 This, however, would be a significant
departure from the Supreme Court's refusal to consider the severity of
the offense in determining reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment.165
164 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). Accord LAFAVE,
supra note 150, § 9.2(c) ("The Terry rule should be expressly limited to investigation of
serious offenses.").
165 For scholarship calling on courts to consider the severity of the offense under
investigation in making Fourth Amendment determinations, see David Keenan & Tina M.
Thomas, Note, An Offense-Severity Modelfor Stop-and-Frisks, 123 YALE L.J. 1448, 1469
(2014); Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment:
Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REv. 1, 4 (2011); Eugene
Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1973-74
(2004); Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REv. 753, 778-87 (2002); William J.
Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114
HARV. L. REv. 842, 847 (2001); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension ofFourth
Amendment "Reasonableness", 98 CoLUM. L. REv. 1642, 1644 (1998); Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 784 (1994); William A.
Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth Amendment Equations -
Warrantless Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38 U. KAN. L. REV.
439, 518 (1990). For cases refusing the call, see for example, United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 412 (2012) (noting in dicta that "[t] here is no precedent for the proposition that
whether a search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being investigated");
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 8o6, 813 (1996) (upholding detention based on probable
cause of traffic violation and "foreclose[ing] any argument that the constitutional
reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers
involved"); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978) (finding that seriousness of crime
does not create exigency justifying warrantless search); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
395 (1978) (rejecting "murder-scene" exception to Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement despite severity of crime). For an argument that the concurrences in United
States v. Jones raise the possibility of crime-severity as a factor in Fourth Amendment
reasonableness determinations, see, Scott J. Glick, Consequence, Weapons ofMass
Destruction, and the Fourth Amendment's "No-Win"Scenario, 90 IND. L.J. 1, 19-20
(2015). See also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (dicta) (the
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C. A Lidster-Style Exception to the Warrant Requirement for
Predictive Surveillance
A somewhat narrower doctrinal approach to finding predictive
surveillance reasonable would create an exception analogous to the
exception for suspicionless, "information-seeking" checkpoints in
Illinois v. Lidster. 66 Although the scale of predictive surveillance would
dwarf the single checkpoint in Lidster, they share a common trait: both
were conducted without individualized suspicion.
In Lidster, the police were investigating a fatal hit-and-run accident
on a highway. 67 They set up a checkpoint on the same highway a week
later at the same time of night near the location of the accident to try to
gather information from the public.168 The Court recognized that
suspicionless checkpoints set up to "detect evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing" violated the Fourth Amendment absent special
circumstances.1 69 However, the Court held that the "information-
seeking" checkpoint was not subject to the rule of City of Indianapolis
v. Edmond prohibiting checkpoints that merely serve a "general
interest in crime control."17o First, the Lidster checkpoint merely asked
for information about a crime "in all likelihood committed by others,"
rather than trying to determine whether the vehicle occupants were
committing a crime.171 Next, the Lidster Court noted that highway
travelers have a somewhat diminished expectation of privacy and that
suspicionless highway stops have been allowed for sobriety checks and
border patrol stops.172 Third, the Court reasoned that individualized
"Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set
up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack").
166 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
167 Id. at 422.
168 Id. at 422, 427.
169 Id. at 423 (citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000)) (holding that
checkpoint stopping vehicles to look for evidence of drug crimes violated the Fourth
Amendment).
170 Lidster, 54o U.S. at 424 (citing Edmund, 531 U.S. at 44).
171 Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423.
172 Id. at 424.
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suspicion has no role to play in a purely information-seeking
checkpoint, just as it has no role to play in other legitimate police
activities like crowd control and public safety.173 Finally, the Court
reasoned that information-seeking checkpoints were inherently less
intrusive because they were brief and unlikely to elicit self-
incriminating information.174
Having distinguished Edmond, the Court applied the
reasonableness standard by balancing the gravity of the government
interest, the degree to which the checkpoint served that interest, and
the severity of the intrusion on individual liberty.175 The Court reasoned
that the government interest was grave because they were investigating
a fatal crime and because they were investigating a specific, known
crime rather than "unknown crimes of a general sort."17 6 In addition,
the Court noted that the information-seeking checkpoint significantly
advanced the governmental interest because the checkpoint took place
on the same highway about a week later and at roughly the same time
of night as the hit and run.177 Finally, the Court reasoned that the
intrusion on liberty was relatively minimal because it involved just a
few minutes of waiting, and because the law enforcement contact
involved brief questioning and the distribution of a flyer. 178 On balance,
the Court found the information-seeking checkpoint to be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.
Courts deciding whether predictive surveillance is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment may draw several parallels to Lidster. First,
predictive surveillance used for counter-terrorism could certainly be
seen as going beyond the ordinary needs of law enforcement. Indeed,
Edmond recognized in dicta that a checkpoint aimed at thwarting a
known terrorist attack or catching a dangerous criminal would be
permissible.179 Although the Supreme Court has not opined on whether
antiterrorism searches go beyond ordinary law enforcement for
173 Id. at 424-25.
174 Id. at 425.
175 Id. at 426-27.
176 Id. at 427.
177 Id. at 427.
178 Id. at 427-28.
179 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
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purposes of the special needs exception,so lower courts have held that
they do.181 To the extent that predictive surveillance also targeted future
criminal activity, courts might reason that predicting and deterring
future crimes also go beyond ordinary law enforcement. There is at
least tangential support for this notion in the Court's cases determining
that the probable cause standard did not apply to government
intrusions seeking to prevent hazardous conditions.1 82 Next, the
governmental interest would be far weightier than the interest in
Lidster if the predictive surveillance scheme were limited to predicting
i8o Courts and commentators disagree about whether Lidster was a "special needs" case.
Compare United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 8o (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that Lidster,
applied the "special needs doctrine"), and David H. Kaye, Why So Contrived? Fourth .
Amendment Balancing, Per Se Rules, and DNA Databases After Maryland v. King, 1o4 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 535, 552-53 n.117 (2014) ("Lidster is regarded conventionally as a
special needs case"), and Josh Gupta-Kagan, Beyond Law Enforcement: Camreta v.
Greene, Child Protection Investigations, and the Need to Reform the Fourth Amendment
Special Needs Doctrine, 87 TUL. L. REV. 353, 373 (2012) (referring to Lidster as "an earlier
special needs case"), with Julie Rikelman, Justifying Forcible DNA Testing Schemes
Under the Special Needs Exception to the Fourth Amendment: A Dangerous Precedent, 59
BAYLOR L. REv. 41, 6o n.131 ("The Second Circuit's treatment of Lidster as a special needs
case is incorrect. Lidster is a checkpoint case, which the Court has explicitly distinguished
from those dealing with 'special needs.'"). For present purposes, the label does not matter
because both Lidster and the special needs doctrine expressly consider whether the
suspicionless search serves needs beyond ordinary law enforcement. Illinois v. Lidster, 540
U.S. 419, 423-25 (2004); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995).
181 See, e.g., United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 958-61 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding pre-
boarding search of airline passengers' carry-on baggage); Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67,
87 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding random, warrantless searches of ferry commuters' carry-on
baggage and vehicles to prevent terrorist attacks); MacWade v. Kelly, 46o F.3d 260, 275
(2d Cir. 2006) (upholding random, suspicionless search of subway passengers' baggage);
United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 181 (3d Cir. 20o6) (upholding pre-boarding search
of airline passengers' carry-on baggage); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500-01
(2d Cir. 1974) (upholding suspicionless searches of airline passengers' persons and carry-
on luggage). For a comprehensive analysis of antiterrorism searches and the special needs
exception, see, Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special
Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 843, 915-21 (2010) (arguing that suspicionless antiterrorism searches
do not fit into the Supreme Court's administrative search or special needs search
categories, and proposing that the Court treat an antiterrorism search as lawful under the
special needs exception so long as any evidence gathered in the search is excluded from any
criminal prosecution).
1
8
2 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Rabb, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989)
(customs service trying to prevent drug use by employees in sensitive positions); Board of
Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834-35 (2002) (school district trying to prevent drug use
by students).
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terrorism or mass-casualty crimes.183 And if the government could
demonstrate that the predictive surveillance is reasonably likely to
identify suspects, then the surveillance would advance the government
interest more directly than the suspicionless questioning in Lidster.
Although predictive surveillance's intrusion upon individual liberties
would dwarf the brief questioning in Lidster, courts might justify the
intrusion based on the magnitude of the governmental interest.
There are, however, conceptual differences between predictive
surveillance and the information-seeking checkpoint in Lidster. First,
Lidster did not involve an entirely suspicionless search, because the
police were investigating a specific crime in the area one week earlier.
Predictive surveillance would seek to predict unspecified future acts.
Second, Lidster relied in part on the fact that the information-gathering
checkpoint did not attempt to elicit evidence that the vehicle occupants
had committed the crime. In contrast, predictive surveillance would not
only build predictive models; it would also apply those models to
emerging data and identify suspects. In light of these differences, courts
may have a difficult time fitting predictive surveillance into an
exception modeled on Lidster.
D. The Keith Case's Domestic Security Exception to the Warrant and
Probable Cause Requirement
The narrowest way to approve predictive surveillance would be to
rely on the rarely litigated exception to the warrant requirement for
domestic security investigations. In United States v. United States
District Court (the Keith case), the Supreme Court discussed how the
Fourth Amendment applied to the investigation of a CIA office bombing
in Michigan.184 The government tapped the defendant's phones based
solely on the Attorney General's approval, rather than obtaining
judicial approval.185 The Supreme Court rejected the government's
183 For a proposal that antiterrorism surveillance should be permissible under the special
needs doctrine and that evidence derived from such surveillance should be admissible only
in prosecution of terrorism crimes, see, Russell D. Covey, Pervasive Surveillance and the
Future of the Fourth Amendment, 8o MIss. L.J. 1289, 1311 (2011). For a proposal that
antiterrorism searches should be permissible under the special needs doctrine but that
evidence derived from such surveillance should be excluded from any subsequent
prosecution, see Simmons, supra note 182, at 915-21.
184 United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 299 (1972).
185 Id. at 300-01.
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argument that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to domestic
security investigations.1 8 6 However, the Court also reasoned that the
Fourth Amendment may apply more flexibly in domestic security
investigations than in law enforcement investigations. 87 The
procedures need only be "reasonable both in relation to the legitimate
need of Government for intelligence information and the protected
rights of our citizens."88 Ultimately, the Court held that, in light of the
intrusion that wiretaps present, wiretaps in domestic security cases
require some form of prior judicial approval but need not comply with
the strictures of the Wiretap Act.189
No court to date has considered whether the Keith case's approach
to domestic security investigations could apply to bulk data collection.
The courts that approved bulk telephone metadata collection simply
held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply because of the third-
party doctrine.190 On the other hand, Judge Leon's finding that the
program was likely unconstitutional did not consider the Keith case at
all.191 Instead, Judge Leon reasoned that, even if warrantless searches
were authorized because of special needs beyond ordinary law
enforcement, bulk collection was unnecessary because the government
186 Id. at 319-20. Lower courts have relied on Keith to define a foreign intelligence 2
exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to
Section 1o5B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011 (FISA Ct.
Rev. 2008) ("Applying principles derived from the special needs cases, we conclude that
this type of foreign intelligence surveillance possesses characteristics that qualify it for
such an exception."); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir.
1980) ("[T]he needs of the executive are so compelling in the area of foreign intelligence,
unlike the area of domestic security, that a uniform warrant requirement would, following
Keith, 'unduly frustrate' the President in carrying out his foreign affairs responsibilities.").
Yet predictive surveillance would largely involve domestic data about Americans, and
therefore would not fall within a foreign intelligence exception.
187Keith, 407 U.S. at 323-24.
188Id. at 323.
189 Id. at 323-24.
19o In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *2-3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013); ACLU v.
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
191 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30-42 (D.D.C. 2013).
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could seek targeted orders from each of the telecommunications
providers.192
As a result, the field is wide open for courts to authorize predictive
surveillance under the Keith case's flexible approach. The Keith case
teaches that, to collect intelligence for domestic security investigations,
the procedures need only be reasonable in relation to the government's
need for domestic security intelligence information.193 The Keith case
justified a more flexible definition of reasonableness in domestic
security investigations because such investigations can involve
difficulty in identifying targets and often attempt to prevent future
acts.194 Similar concerns would be present in a predictive surveillance
program aimed at counter-terrorism. Developing specific targets would
be impossible without first gathering and analyzing all of the data. And
the program's purpose would be to prevent future threats to domestic
security.
To draft a predictive surveillance regime likely to comply with the
Keith case, Congress would first have to limit the permissible uses of
the information to counter-terrorism and other domestic security
threats. If the surveillance could be used for broader purposes, the
Keith case would not apply at all. Second, Congress would likely have
to impose some form of advance judicial approval of the bulk collection.
Despite the flexibility of its balancing approach, the Court emphasized
the importance of prior judicial approval as a check upon executive
branch discretion.195 Given the Court's recognition that the form of
prior judicial approval may adapt to the government interest in
domestic security cases,196 Congress could require a prior judicial
finding that predictive surveillance was likely to reveal patterns
associated with counter-terrorism or domestic security threats.
Relying on the Keith case to authorize predictive surveillance would
have the laudable effect of limiting the permissible uses of such a
powerful technology. This might mean sacrificing the ability to prevent
some types of criminal activity that predictive surveillance could detect.
192 Id. at 38-41.
193 Keith, 407 U.S. at 322-24.
194 Id. at 322.
195 Id. at 316-18.
196 Id. at 321-23.
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Such a limitation offers a reasonable tradeoff in light of the sweeping
data collection that predictive surveillance would require.197
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of predictive analytics' significant role in people's lives, it
seems inevitable that the government will eventually turn to predictive
surveillance. Assuming that the government can overcome the
technical and political challenges, predictive surveillance will present a
significant doctrinal challenge. Courts will feel great pressure to
approve predictive surveillance, and they will have a variety of doctrinal
approaches at their disposal. This Article proposes that courts should
adopt the narrowest possible approach to avoid destabilizing existing
Fourth Amendment doctrine. The narrowest approach would be. to
avoid dramatic expansion of the third-party and public-exposure
doctrines, and rely instead on the Keith case's domestic security
exception to the warrant requirement. Not only would that approach
avoid creating or expanding an exception to the warrant requirement;
it would also limit the use of predictive surveillance to domestic security
threats. Such an approach would represent a reasonable compromise
between the promise of predictive surveillance and the intrusion posed
by bulk data collection.
'97 For a discussion of the safeguards that Congress would need to build into a predictive
surveillance statute, see, Spencer, supra note lo, at 527-36.
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